

**UNIVERSITY "Ovidius"**  
**Faculty of History and Political Science**

**ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV  
RELATIONS FROM CONFLICT TO  
COOPERATION  
(1945 - 1956)**

**- Thesis -**

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## SUMMARY

Keywords: *Cold War, agreement percentages, strategic glacis, communism, Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, security dilemma, informational warfare, propaganda, iron curtain, public diplomacy, The Second Red Scare, crisis, Kominform, Yugoslav schism, artificial conflict, socialism with a human face, destalinisation, cult of personality, deportation.*

In the formation of the postwar world, the imposition and the growing of the Soviet hegemony in Central and South-East Europe was a significant phenomenon. The concrete realities of each country in the region were calling for adequate strategies and at the same time taking advantage of the deep crisis caused by World War II, the Soviets will impose their own political and ideological system. But the survival of the new political power, as conceived by theorists of communism, was possible only through a top-down reconstruction of the entire society, which meant that the new regime will come into conflict with the structures and institutions that ensure democratic existence and its dynamic. This will lead to a number of adjustments of ideological and power structures that will enter into conflict with the vision of the new East European hegemony over space.

Communism<sup>1</sup> - political ideology whose objective was the establishment of an ideal society characterized by collective ownership and common life, in which everyone works to the extent possible and receives as needed, was to become the dominant ideology in the countries of Eastern Europe (1945 - 1989). This was achieved in most countries by force. Followers as Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Tito have built every type of communism from Marx's vision of revolution and classless society, but they have created individual ideological variants to adapt Marxism to the type of society and economy in which it would work, but they were allowed only if the characteristics of a great power were met.<sup>2</sup> From this perspective for Romania and Yugoslavia research is an interesting case. The strategy adopted by the Romanian Communist Party (P.C.d.R.) and applied after March 6, 1945 by Petru Groza government, sought to capitalize on the Soviet experience while exhibiting "a deep understanding of the realities of the new" as expressing a leading Communist Vasile Luca.<sup>3</sup> Communist Party of Yugoslavia will do different, and this was not going to go unnoticed in Moscow. Such differences have arisen due to the fact that there are major differences in political, economic, socio-cultural fields between states that became satellites of Moscow and the U.S.S.R. in the early '50s, political and social structure of

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<sup>1</sup> Communism - political doctrine of the extreme left. It was born in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century (Communist Manifesto was published by Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels in February 1948). Oleg Serebrian *Dictionary of Geopolitics, Science*, Ed. Polirom, 2006, p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Jan Palmowski, *Oxford Dictionary of contemporary world history from 1900 until today*, vol.1, translated by Simona Ceaușu, Bucharest, Ed. BIC ALL, 2007, p. 204.

<sup>3</sup> Ioan Scurtu, *Romania. Politics. 1945 Documents I*, Bucharest, State Archives of Romania, 1996, doc. no. 18.

countries that were occupied by the Red Army at the end of World War II was more or less similar to that of the Soviet Union. Earth and factories were nationalized and there remained no bourgeois property models. Power was in the hands of parties claiming monolithic Stalinist socialist construction. There is however a significant difference between these countries and the Soviet Union relative to their origins. The Soviet State was founded following a victorious proletarian revolution, which was later betrayed. Eastern European states have emerged, not only without the active involvement of the working class, but since the working class was suppressed, with violence.

From this perspective it is easy to see why after the end of World War II, the U.S.S.R. exercised a powerful influence on "the establishment of communist regimes loyal to Moscow."<sup>4</sup>, in Eastern Europe. That is why it wanted to have total control over the countries of the region through the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as his "big brother" and more experienced. In the first years after the war, the target was successful, but there was an event as "U.S.S.R. suffered a serious failure"<sup>5</sup> in Yugoslavia.

Even with the opening of archives there are difficult to identify those reasons that led to the rupture of breast resounding in the communist world - the exclusion of Yugoslavia from Kominform, in June 1948. Soviet official explanations to justify excommunication of Yugoslav leadership seem, after further analysis, to be only excuses. The fact is that this affected relations with all states subservient to Moscow.

In the scientific approach that we have proposed, entitled "***Romanian-Yugoslav relations from conflict to cooperation (1945 - 1956)***", the main objective that I followed was complex and consisted in identifying the stages of evolution of the Romanian –Yugoslavian relations, the newly created international and regional context after World War, analyzing the causes that led to the conflict, an it is true an artificial conflict, triggered by the order of the Kremlin,<sup>6</sup> but I put emphasis on the factors that led to the normalization of relations which have resulted in the resumption of friendly relations between the two countries, implemented mainly through economic cooperation.

The period in which we proposed the analysis of the Romanian-Yugoslav relations (1945 – 1956) includes the first Yugoslav schism. Fixing chronological limits should not be regarded as intent of a comprehensive approach, but as a symbol identifying the two dates, giving the fact that we have not archival documents from the former Yugoslavia, our analysis is referring only to documents from the archives of Romania therefore we made the analysis from a Romanian perspective. 1945 is the year ending the Second World War by defeating Nazi Germany, the year

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<sup>4</sup> Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Andre Kaspi, *History of International Relations, 1948 - to the present day*, Volume II, translated Anca Airinei, Bucharest, Social and Political Sciences, 2006, p. 35.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 38.

<sup>6</sup> The conflict was an exogenous construct between two neighboring nations in which there were involved press censorship, and large-scale manipulation and use methods involving terror.

in which geopolitical transformations occur, and The European space emerges from increasingly clear spheres of influence, while the 1956 is a very eventful year both at international and European level.<sup>7</sup> We will stop at the significance relevant to our topic. 1956 is the year that U.R.S.S. achieved full normalization of relations with Yugoslavia as Khrushchev delivers its Secret Report on Stalin as being the main culprit for breaking relations with this country, and launches destalinization, the year when the Kominform is dissolved, and the Romanian-Yugoslav relations are re-entering on the right track through mutual visits by the two leaders from the Romanian People's Republic to Yugoslavia (23 – 26 June) and the Romanian People's Republic of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (22 – 29 October ).

The motivation of this scientific approach starts from a concrete reality represented by the return in force to the attention of academics and analysts, of the research on the Balkans in general and on relations between the Balkan and Romanian-Yugoslav relations implicitly. We appreciate that the topic of interest is under review for several reasons. One reason is that, although the existence of contemporary historiography there is a real interest in the development of Romanian-Yugoslav relations, there is a comprehensive analysis of research devoted to this development, seen from the angle relationship type or chronological sequence of important events related to the binomial conflict-cooperation, manifested in the dynamics of the Cold War.

That is why we proposed an interdisciplinary research that has history in the center of analysis, for which we take into account the specific requirements of studying recent history through critical evaluation of the facts, the confrontation between the categories of information and using available sources. We mention that in this research, based on events, we call the disciplines of history border: diplomacy, communication and international relations theory. Introducing a systemic perspective and integrated analysis will highlight the fact that the Romanian state showed excessive obedience to power in Moscow (in the period of rupture and after that).

The analysis of the Cold War, international threshold gives us a picture of profound changes in both geopolitical and from the point of view of power of former allies. The end of the Second World War caused the major victors of the war to recognize the interests manifested in Europe. To know the evolution of the Romanian-Yugoslav in the first decade of the Cold War, their contextualization is necessary in all international relations exhibited in Europe and which have dominated the East-West confrontation, and the relationships within the communist bloc faced with Yugoslav schism.

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<sup>7</sup> In 1956 there is the "Spring Warsaw" (June to October), the Hungarian Revolution (October-November) and the Suez crisis (October-November).

East-West relations as a research and the policy developing into blocks which generated a crisis led us logically to organize the first chapter into two distinct parts. The first part consists of four chapters. Within these we followed several main objectives.

The first objective was to achieve a synthesis of the stages of the Second World War, the identification of the premises; ideological and political and military-political causes that have led to the Cold War, and of how the confrontation between the two superpowers materialized in the South-Eastern European continent. For this reason, in the second part of the chapter, I pointed out and analyzed the interests of the great powers in Europe at the end of World War II.

Thus, Soviet plans for post-war organization of the world are included in the proposals made by three committees that were tasked with defining the position of the Soviet Union in talks with the Allies. These committees were: "The Commission Litvinov", "The Voroshilov Commission" and "Commission Maiski", also known as the "Committee for repairs". The largest, I. M. Maiski text is produced and sent to Molotov on 11 January 1944. Andrei Gromiko is also the author of a memoir entitled "On the issue of Soviet-American relations," which was submitted to Molotov on July 14, 1944, while M. M. Litvinov addressed the issue through three memos. The most important is entitled "On the prospects and possible Soviet-British cooperation."

Memories have common elements:

- primacy of the security of U.R.S.S.;
- maintaining the anti-Hitler coalition;
- the control of the three great powers of the world, divided into spheres of influence;
- the belief that there will be a conflict between the United States and Britain;
- the documents do not have the idea of "export of revolution";
- none of those documents mention the possibility of establishment of communist regimes in the Soviet security sphere.

As regards the U.K., it showed lack of interest for Romania and the countries of South-East Europe and an excepting interest for Greece. It is understandable that in the postwar reorganization of Europe, the main concern of the British government remains the country that belonged to the same geopolitical and geostrategic areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, which integrate The Suez Canal.

U.S. interests for South-Eastern Europe in general and Romania in particular, can be highlighted through the development of ideas of Hamilton Fish Armstrong (an influential editor of the magazine "Foreign Affairs"), supported by the State Department. He supported the idea of a law of international policy that "great power surrounded by a number of smaller states must exercise the chip requires a dominant interest on their businesses." Thus, gradually, in the Department State, began to dominate the idea that the Soviet Union has the right to control the

foreign policy of countries in its immediate vicinity. U.S. attitude towards Romania was furthermore based on two other considerations:

- the major contribution to the defeat of the Red Army by Germany;
  - a parallel between the situation in Italy and Romania, especially after 23 august 1944;
- the basic idea is that the Anglo-Americans considered Italy as belonging exclusively to their sphere of influence, as the U.S.S.R. consider Romania. Any Anglo-American intervention in Romania was speculated by Stalin to intervene in Italy.

The second objective is dedicated to presenting the ideological and politico-military causes of the emergence of the Cold War. It was called metaphorically a *cold war*. It was impossible to use a military confrontation on a global scale and then superpowers turned to the communication strategy (the imagological war, the information war, etc.). This war was "very strange". Although apocalyptic rhetoric was dominated by the two superpowers, it never presented an imminent danger of a world war. There are several theories about the emergence responsible for the superpower's Cold War, but the truth is that the superpowers "accepted a global distribution of force", and "established a very unequal balance of power, but an undeniable one."

Establishment of favorable Soviet governments in South-East Europe and the situation in Greece has led to an uncertain U.S. response that launched the Truman Doctrine, the first official affirmation of the strategy of containment (containment) of the communist expansion. The launch followed an extensive economic assistance plan in 1947, the Marshall Plan. This plan was seen by Stalin as being directed against the Soviet Union. He responded with two steps: creating a new center to coordinate international communist movement - Kominform - and the imposition of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe.

Section entitled "Image Reconstruction of the U.S.S.R. as an enemy of the U.S. during 1945 - 1947" defines the third goal: trying to bring new elements by addressing topics treated less in Romanian historiography, as the American projects and their stages, which were reconstructing the-Russian image (Communist) which was presented during the Cold War as the embodiment of **evil**, the **enemy**.

In 1945 the United States will emerge victorious from the Second World War. It's the time when American public diplomacy showed to the world the new face of American law savior of mankind. Against this background American nation begin to perceive themselves in a overvalued positive mark. Gradually, the U.S. will be perceived in the international environment - as Secretary of State Henry L. Simpson claimed - "as a country frivolous, selfish, pleasure-loving, which does not take seriously the task of living in a tough international order".

The time and history show that whenever American consumerism and hedonism have reached an alarming level, a "threat" stepped out of the shadows designed to empower American



society and work in the American collective mind ... fear. In this respect in the first years after World War we witnessed. The *First Red Scare* constructed image, which was built through an imagological operation with the negative image of Soviet communism in the interwar period. Likewise, after the euphoria of the end of World War II begins *The Second Red Scare* image construction. There were three pivotal moments in *The Second Red Scare* image construction: **The Long-Telegram** - 22 February, 1946, **The Fulton Moment** – 5 March, 1946 and **The Mr. X Moment**, in July 1947.

For the same purpose there was developed the *Solar Project* (the name is a consequence of the fact that this project was developed in secret at the White House solarium). It is centered around three major American political figures of the Cold War: George F. Kennan, Paul H. Nitze and Andrew J. Goodpaster.

The second part of the analysis is centered on "**a different kind of cold war**." This is constituted by the Yugoslav-Soviet disputes within the Communist bloc in the period 1948 - 1953, embodied in the so-called *red schism*, as it is known in Romanian historiography. The objectives were: identifying the causes that led to the Yugoslav-Soviet crisis, presenting the impact of the crisis on international relations in Central and South-East European and international echoes of schism.

Yugoslav-Soviet conflict causes are multiple and complex, but the basic is the challenge to the Soviet hegemony posed by Tito. The rift between the two communist countries has not occurred suddenly, it has a systematic trend over several months, from winter to summer of 1948.

Although in the early schism, Yugoslavia was in a state of isolation, it will refocus quickly to other partners. In 1954 it concluded "The Balkan Pact" with Greece and Turkey. Yugoslavia also captures the attention of the West, which grants a significant and sustained economic support. It even tried to attract Yugoslavia into NATO. Stalin's death and Khrushchev came to power brings reconciliation with Tito. Its membership to communism is recognized, leading to normalization of diplomatic relations on 15 June 1953 and restore connections at the embassy in June 1954.

I named the second chapter: "**Romanian-Yugoslav relations between the Cold War and hot peace**"; after the Second World War the architecture of international relations will experience the phenomenon known in the historiography as the Cold War. This has seen many moments of tension and conflict between the two blocs manifested both by new formats, but also within blocks. Such a conflict, manifested in the communist bloc, was Yugoslav schism.

The analyzed period – 1947-1953 – is the tension period transformed into the conflict between which led to the Soviet-Yugoslav schism. Year 1947 is the start of tensions between Stalin and Tito and 1953 is the year of Stalin's death, the seizure of power by Khrushchev and

the first steps toward normalizing relations with the Soviet Union satellite states and R.P.F. Yugoslav.

In this chapter we presented:

- steps towards crisis and conflict in the Romanian-Yugoslav relations;
- "unnecessarily dialogue" between the two states in this period, organized as mutual accusations;
- we made reference to alleged preparations for a war of the Soviet bloc with R.P.F.I.;
- we oriented the analysis presenting the actions of propaganda, manipulation and misinformation towards domestic and international public opinion, but I also treated the process of hunting activities, conviction and deportation of Titoists in Baragan.

In the first chapter entitled "*The Evolution of Romanian-Yugoslav relations to crisis and conflict*", we present the nature of Romanian-Yugoslav relations in the years 1944 to 1945. Note that relations were quite strained because there was a sustained act of partisan groups, which partially animated Serb civilians and Yugoslav communist circuit to claim embed parts of Romanian Banat. Miodrag Milin, one of the best specialists in the field, explains Serbs behavior on both sides of the Danube as determined by extremely complicated international relations in this part of Europe and due to strained relations between Romanian and Serbian states.

In mid-1945, the number of Yugoslav military incursions decreased in Romanian territory, the Romanian authorities have started to exercise powers and relations between Romanian and Yugoslav citizens enter into normality. This was due to the historical tradition of Romanian-Yugoslav relations and stereotypes existing in the Romanian collective mind. In this chapter we also made references to diplomatic relations, economic, cultural exchanges between the Romanian and Yugoslav states. We presented the main treaties, the economic and cultural agreements concluded between the two countries between 1945 -1947 and the reciprocal official visits of the leaders of the two countries. We have dedicated a part of the analysis of how the two countries were reflected in the media of one another.

Even though the history of bilateral relations of Romania and Yugoslavia were not faced with perennial disputes, bilateral relations in the communist period began with the radical transformation of the elements defining the relationship between Belgrade and Bucharest. Communists seized power in Romania with the support of Moscow and not by popular vote as in Yugoslavia and were aware that they can not stay in power without this support. It is why the Romanian communist leaders followed Stalin's instructions when the schism started. Romanian-Yugoslav conflict has emerged, it was a temporary construct, situational and exogenous involving two neighboring peoples. After heading the alignment with Moscow, Dej took the opportunity and eliminated political opponents whom he accused of right deviationism, Titoism etc.

I pointed this subchapter and the causes of schism:

- initiation of a project by Tito creating a Danubian Confederation, including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania to join subsequently (The independence of decisions taken by Tito angered Stalin).
- another question: Tito's intention to engage in the civil war in Greece and to establish, contrary to Soviet interests, its own hegemony in the Balkans.

Stalin countered through diplomacy Tito's actions: in February 1948 he called the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders in Moscow and challenged them to sign protocols in which Moscow was been promised to be consulted on economic issues but also on issues of foreign policy. Tito reacted harshly and ordered the isolation of Soviet advisers, thus depriving the Soviet secret service information required by the Communist Party of the Soviet leadership. Another thing that angered Stalin in December 1947 was the ending of the proliferation of mixed economic societies).

From 17 to 18 March 1948, Moscow recalled its military and economic advisers, accusing the Yugoslav government of maltreatment. In a letter from March 27, 1948 Stalin and Molotov accused Djilas of anti-Soviet statements. Stalin decides to "normalize" the situation. By normalizing it meant bringing Yugoslavia to ally condition and subject fully subject. Convened for this purpose was the Kominform conference from 19 to 28 June in Bucharest. Yugoslavia did not participate. Discussions were just a long string of invectives against Yugoslav leaders. It was adopted a resolution on June 28, 1948 in which the inter alia called for Yugoslav communists loyal to Moscow to revolt.

The second chapter is entitled ***"Duel complaints and increased rupture between the Romanian and Yugoslavian"***. For Romanian public opinion and international public opinion political developments in the bilateral Romanian-Yugoslav plan seems paradoxical, because by the middle of 1948 the Romanian government had a very good cooperation with the government in Belgrade, and because at just one day after the closing work of the Kominform conference, Romanian communist leaders begun intensive work to convince the Romanian society of the errors and mistakes made by the-Yugoslav communists.

A harsh criticism that will raise the intensity of calumnies and will increase the gap between the two states and governments was made by Dej in an article published in the first issue of the newspaper "Class Struggle". Belgrade officials responded to complaints by other invectives regarding the Romanian leaders. Thus arises a war of words and mutual bellicose behavior. The press of the two countries became not only a factor of manipulation and propaganda but also a tool for the Communist leaders who were engaged in the "war of the deaf" in order to misinform each other. This was neither to the benefit of Romania nor of Yugoslavia, because there were material and financial damage on both sides. Thus remained the conservation

status problem or the problem of giving up the waterworks projects and other common interests between Romania and Yugoslavia border.

This war will be total because Yugoslavia was not invited to the meeting of 5 January 1949 establishing the CMEA.

In the conflict between the leaderships of the two communist parties in Romania and Yugoslavia were drawn people who were in open opposition to their own state and government. So it was decided to grant political asylum to all those who fled from Yugoslavia and in some cases even Romanian citizenship. There will be a newspaper of migrants called "Under the banner of internationalism."

This conflict has seriously affected diplomatic relations between the two neighbors. At the request of the Kremlin, the Romanian government denounced the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with the R.P.F. Yugoslavia and the railway convention between the two countries concluded on 3 September 1946 was denounced.

The third meeting of the Kominform took place between 16 and 19 November 1949 in Budapest, and Dej had the fore as rapporteur. He described the situation in Yugoslavia but not in accordance with the line of reality but in the terms that Stalin and the Soviet leadership wanted to hear. The conference resolutions of the Information Bureau will be reviewed at a meeting. The achievements and so-called shortcomings will be highlighted. The measures taken in this meeting will attract attention that will be the basis for the deportation activity of the Serbo-Croatian population from Baragan and Banat, which was turned into a human tragedy.

We called the third chapter ***"Romanian-Yugoslav border incidents and military preparations to attack Yugoslavia."*** We presented the views of Romanian and foreign specialists who argue that Stalin, in an attempt to eliminate Tito, thought of and choose a military intervention. To this date we do not know if documents have been published confirming the existence of a military campaign plan developed by Moscow. Most of those who believe that this plan has been prepared are quoted in the memoirs of a former general, Bela Kiraly, published in exile.

One year after the border incidents the Yugoslavs had taken some security measures (approx. 1450 incident, according to some historians have taken place at the Yugoslav border with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.)

Romania had an increased strategic importance in the Soviet plans. Therefore the Soviets increased the military involvement while six Army divisions were in a constant state of alarm. In the Craiova and Timisoara there were regularly organized military maneuvers ending with large military parade, with the presence of important leaders of the Communist Party in order to intimidate. They also spent large sums of money to achieve a defensive system.

Although in the first phase of the conflict the facing armed forces were relatively balanced, the balance of power would become net for the Soviet bloc. In January 1952 U.S. intelligence appreciated that at the northern and southern border of Yugoslavia were massed 38 divisions with approximately 590,000 troops, a force twice the Yugoslav forces.

In this situation, Yugoslavia had to resort to importing weapons and technology from the West, although at first it was reluctant to do so. We emphasize that it was not an important quantity.

A summary conclusion would be that all this effort in preparing a military campaign of attack and defense proved useless because Stalin decided to abandon the military solution, for reasons we can only assume. The massive losses in the war that just ended, the outbreak of the Korean war should have been recent memories for Stalin, in order to respect the spheres of influence.

The fourth chapter we called *"Propaganda, manipulation and misinformation at the level of domestic and international public opinion."* Tension between the two neighbors was maintained and even intensified by the war media. With the aim of anathematizing the opponent there were chosen some main themes from the communist propaganda arsenal.

Tito's image with bloody ax in his hand became a leitmotif found in brochures and posters distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies in institutions, schools, garrisons and military establishments. Popular hatred meetings in the classical sense were common. People were taught to despise a man and a regime about whom and which they actually did not know anything directly and objectively. Associating the coalition anti-Tito, Gheorghiu-Dej used all means of propaganda to fight to please the leaders in Moscow. They were deployed all mass media, especially the press and radio, but other image vectors as literature, art and cinema were not neglected.

Among those were Romanian Communist propaganda and official newspaper of the Party called "Class Struggle" and newspaper "Sparkle". Note that throughout this period there were Communist press texts accompanied by anti-Titoists cartoons highly suggestive according to which Tito was sold to the imperialists. Propaganda and disinformation were also used to mask the activities of organized repression against political enemies, real or perceived.

We called the fifth chapter *„Hunting, conviction and deportation of Titoists in Baragan."* For the scope of judging and condemning all Titoists a series of laws and regulations were adopted. Thus, in January 1949 Law 16 was adopted by the Grand National Assembly and its implementation started. As a result the party could have the means of hunting Titoists. On February 7, 1949 the Law 110 was established regarding the security forces.

All this made possible "The Romanian version of Siberia", on the night of 17 to 18 June 1951.

Police and security bodies have prepared tables of the main suspects who posed in their opinion an immediate danger and who lived in the area 25 km from the border with Yugoslavia. Such lists are used in Romanian historiography and are defined as the Trial of Titoism in Romania. It was held in Bucharest on 1-3 august 1950. A target number of 12 persons, who under torture and psychological pressure, "recognized" all the accusations and received the death penalty, life imprisonment or a long time and prohibiting civil rights.

The number of people regarded as Titoist arrested by the Security during this period has increased steadily. If in 1950 there were arrested about 6600 Titoists in 1951 they numbered more than 19,000, and in 1952 numbered about 25,000 people.

The third chapter of the thesis entitled: *Aspects of Romanian-Yugoslav relations in the period 1953 - 1956* follows the Romanian-Yugoslav relations during that period, in the events held at a regional and international level.

In the first chapter we pointed Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation; steps and consequences. We set the internal and external factors that led to normalization of relations between Romania and Yugoslavia. I showed the interest of Romanian leaders to know the realities of Yugoslavia and to identify opportunities to revive bilateral relations.

In the second chapter we watched how the relations between the two neighboring countries were developed, especially in economic terms, in the context of the outbreak of the revolution in Hungary, but we did also some brief explanations to this revolution.

An analysis to identify the role of the newspaper "Spark" in the action of the image reversal of the Yugoslav communist leader is interesting and necessary. He was revived with the image of a "good friend of the Romanian people" in the new context created by the "new course" initiated by Moscow. This is possible as a result of propaganda campaign launched by the Romanian Communist leaders, to which we referred in the third section. The analysis was based on several articles of the newspaper "Spark", including mutual visits, articles published on the occasion of the two communist leaders visits, Yugoslav and Romanian, We identified articles that have the specific *wood language*, using censorship and the context removal method.

In subchapters four and five we mentioned some of Romanian economy characteristics during 1953 – 1956, followed by the development of economic relations between Romania and Yugoslavia, I have revealed the existence of administrative and political problems in the two countries, but I also made references to cultural and sports relations between them.

After this analysis we drew the following general conclusions:

1. The outbreak and conduct of the Second World War affected radically and permanently the future development of all mankind.
2. Developments in the international relations in the aftermath of the global conflagration caused the phenomenon called the Cold War in historiography.

3. The Cold War was the political polarization of the world around the two newly created blocks, represented by the two superpowers U.S.S.R. and U.S.
4. The monolithic image of the Soviet bloc promoted by the communist leader I. V. Stalin took shape only after the exclusion of Yugoslavia from Kominform, as a punitive measure for insubordination and defiance showed by the communist leader of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito Yugoslavia.
5. After exclusion of Yugoslav Communists, Stalin and the Communist of communist states, at Stalin command, conducted a campaign of furious denigration regarding the Yugoslav communist leader and his cronies. There were taken actions to punish "Titoist" from the satellite countries, Stalin using the leaders of those countries as tools to achieve their goals, but on this occasion, some Communist leaders strengthened their position in the party, by eliminating competition.
6. Conflict between Stalin and Tito drew the involvement of other communist countries which led to the emergence of artificial conflict between Yugoslavia and the countries of people's democracy.
7. The Conflict of Romania headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Yugoslavia led by Josip Broz Tito was held at the level of communist elite. This was a temporary construct, situational and exogenous between the two neighboring nations. The outbreak of conflict was the imposition of guidelines at Moscow which the Romanian communist elite will follow for nearly five years. It could not be otherwise, because if they opposed Stalin's orders, the Romanian communists could not stay in power. In this regard the statement of Molotov, during a discussion with Romanian Communist leaders since 1953 remains remarkable: "You feel safe under the wing of the Soviet Union ... Without our help you will maintain the power no more than two weeks."<sup>8</sup>
8. In the campaign of condemnation and judgment of the Yugoslav leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej showed excessive zeal in carrying out orders from Moscow, following the main objectives: to took the opportunity to eliminate his main political opponents and winning the confidence of the party leaders in Moscow.
9. The idea that there was a covert form of resistance against the communist leaders in the Soviet bloc during the start of the schism is not supported by the archival documents.
10. The campaign against Tito and Titoists in Romania has several aspects: a very intense propaganda campaign through the media that created the image of the Romanian people's enemy Tito, an action of support and organization of Yugoslav immigrants who edited a newspaper of propaganda against Tito: "Under the banner of internationalism", an action to deport people living in an area of 25 kilometers from the Yugoslav border, a true "Romanian Siberia", but also

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<sup>8</sup> Mircea Chirițoiu, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

a process of identification, hunting and even long prison sentencing or even the death sentencing for the Titoists.

11. The conflicts and tensions, crises and disagreements are perhaps the most damaging international relations phenomena and processes in the history of nations, but unfortunately they are part of our existence. Romanian-Yugoslav conflict has affected both diplomatic relations of the States concerned as well as the economic, cultural etc. The misinformation that has been triggered had effects that were felt in the masses that made up these companies. Ordinary people became victims of wooden language, subject to widespread manipulation through the media, controlled from the top, in order to achieve a rollover image, the communist leader and his cronies. The consequences were often grave because it was affected ordinary people's ability to separate reality from reality itself constructed by the media, which served only personal interests of the few, who were in charge.

12. The analysis of statements of persons who witnessed the defamation campaign of the Yugoslav leader, revealed that young people were more easily influenced, especially students who were indoctrinated even by their teachers. They ask students to draw cartoons depicting Yugoslav leader in various poses, stage plays that had as main theme the "fascists Tito" or to be members of the artistic brigades whose activities aimed at denigrating Tito. Adults felt that Tito was the image of a "proud man, like our Maramures." These opinions belong to a small number of people and can not be generalized, but it seemed interesting to observe some of the effects of official propaganda manipulation.

13. The death of Stalin, the seizing of power in the Kremlin by N.S. Khrushchev resulted in a change in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., in terms of relations with Yugoslavia and its leader, Josip Broz Tito.

14. "Canossa" Khrushchev surprised his entourage by resisting the idea of visiting and remembering the military superiority of the Soviet Union to the communist leaders satellite states. Tito was less surprised, this being due to the period before visiting the Yugoslavian leader when Khrushchev gave serious signals that he would be willing to make some compromises for the resumption of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

15. Resumption of Soviet-Yugoslav relations took place according to Tito's claims: recognition of errors by the U.S.S.R., Stalin's guilt, Djilas's exclusion from Yugoslav Communist Party and Titoism acceptance, but also with the manifestation of the surprising flexibility of N. S. Khrushchev, who reads the Secret Report in 1956 and triggers the de-Stalinization in the countries of people's democracy.

16. After the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the satellite countries followed, (implicitly Romania), but this occurred only after the signal from Moscow.



17. From the analysis we did shows that Romanian communist leaders had no role in the Romanian-Yugoslav conflict, but also they showed no initiative in resuming ties with Yugoslavia.

18. Resumption of relations between the two neighboring countries occurred in the economic, political, cultural, artistic, sports, field etc.

19. Yugoslav schism was a lesson for Romanian communist leaders because, regardless of how they develop relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia in the future, they will continue practicing a foreign policy of friendly cooperation in various fields between the two neighboring countries.

20. To mask their servility to Moscow in Romanian public opinion, communist leaders have taken a propaganda campaign to overthrow the Yugoslav leader image, from the enemy to friend of the Romanian people.

The research and analysis it made us realized the need to deepen this approach as a whole, possibly through the use of documents in archives from the former Yugoslavia, which was not possible during the preparation of this thesis for objective reasons, and a more detailed documents from archives in our country for a better understanding of the issues that have been addressed tangentially in this thesis.

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